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“We Have to Take it to the Top!”1: Workers, 
State Policy, and the Making of Home Care* 
JENNIFER KLEIN†  
EILEEN BORIS††  
On Halloween 1988, seventy-five Chicago home care 
workers shouted in front of the Evanston residence of Janet 
Otwell, director of the Illinois Department of Aging (IDOA):  
“No More Tricks, Treat Us with Dignity and Respect!”2 For 
weeks, Otwell had rebuffed their requests for a meeting, so 
these black women, members of Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) Local 880, finally took dramatic 
action.3 Seeking to draw attention to “poverty wages and the 
union-busting activity of vendors in the state’s home health 
care program,” they marched on her lawn, posted notices on 
her door and those of her neighbors, and caused a 
commotion reminiscent of the heyday of the welfare rights 
movement.4 Local 880 President Irma Sherman declared: 
“The vendors are making a tidy profit and we are left living 
from paycheck to paycheck, with no health coverage and no 
benefits to speak of—we’re tired of their bag of tricks.”5 
Since IDOA set the framework for elder home care, the 
union demanded a voice in policymaking along with 
  
 Unless otherwise indicated, portions of the following discussion have been 
drawn from and expand upon scholarship reported in EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER 
KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
WELFARE STATE (2012). 
 1. Union Members Going to Springfield, THE HOMEMAKERS’ VOICE, Mar. 
1985 (quoting Local 880 union member Mary Jones).  
†Yale University. 
††U.C. Santa Barbara. 
 2. For Immediate Release: Homecare Workers Give Halloween Message to 
Director of Aging, Oct. 29, 1988, in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 3, Folder 2, 
available at Wisconsin Historical Society.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; Letter from Gale S. Thetford to Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 
880 (Oct. 31, 1988), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 3, Folder 2, available at 
Wisconsin Historical Society. 
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advocates for the aged. Local 880 got the attention of the 
state and soon became a player in home care politics.6  
Community organizing and political unionism, Local 
880 found, could together improve the lives of home health 
care workers.7 On the one hand, the SEIU had discovered 
an alternative route to unionization through grassroots 
action.8 Rather than an offshoot of a pre-existing local, Local 
880 began as part of the United Labor Unions (ULU), a 
project of the Association for Community Organizations for 
Reform Now or ACORN. ULU represented a workforce 
counterpart to the neighborhood organizing of ACORN.9 On 
the other hand, given the structure of home care, it was 
never enough just to win collective bargaining rights with 
individual agencies—as unions in New York already had 
learned. To make economic gains, the union had to go to 
government.10 But with Reagan Era assaults on public 
benefits and government employees, turning to the state for 
economic rights was no easy matter.11 Political unionism 
would require innovative tactics and new allies.12 
Home aides and attendants perform intimate tasks of 
daily life—such as bathing, brushing teeth, dressing, 
cooking, and cleaning—that enable aged, disabled, or 
chronically ill people to live decent lives at home.13 These 
essential workers are America’s front-line caregivers, but 
they earn average hourly wages lower than that of all other 
jobs in health care and historically have labored without 
security of employment, social benefits, or even workers’ 
  
 6. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH 
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 149 (2012). 
 7. Id. at 149. 
 8. See id. at 149-81 (demonstrating the use of grass roots action and 
organizing by Local 880). 
 9. Id. at 138-43, 176-81; VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS’ UNIONS: REBUILDING 
LABOR FROM BELOW 101-28 (2005). 
 10. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 149. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides: Duties, 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 
2012), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-care-aides. 
htm#tab-2. 
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compensation.14 They labor in private spaces meeting 
individual and family needs.15 But how they do so is a story 
of political economy, one that reflects the major shifts in the 
welfare state and economic life that define contemporary 
America. Home care aides make up a vast workforce of over 
1.8 million workers16—much larger than those of the iconic 
industries of auto and steel—that links our most 
challenging social issues: an aging society; the enormous 
medical sector and its ability to prolong life; the neo-liberal 
restructuring of public services; immigration; disability 
rights; the prospects of health care for all and the potential 
of a new American labor movement.  
Home care is currently the fastest growing occupation 
in the nation, adding hundreds of thousands of positions at 
a steady clip Numbering almost two million at the start of 
the Great Recession, the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projects the fastest employment growth in home 
health aide jobs through 2020.17  
These low-waged workers stand at the center of a new 
care work economy, defined by a continuum of jobs: hospital 
workers, nursing home aides, child care workers, teachers’ 
aides, preschool teachers, school lunch room aides, mental 
health and substance abuse social workers and counselors, 
social and human services assistants and specialists, and 
occupational therapists.18 These jobs are also increasingly 
  
 14. See Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides: Pay, 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 
2012), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-care-
aides.htm#tab-5. 
 15. See Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides: Duties, supra 
note 13. 
 16. See Home Health and Personal Care Aides, Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 2012),  
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-care-
aides.htm#tab-1. 
 17. See id.; Home Health and Personal Care Aides: Job Outlook, Occupational 
Outlook Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-care-
aides.htm#tab-6. 
 18. Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Organizing the Carework Economy: When 
the Private Becomes Public, in RETHINKING U.S. LABOR HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE 
WORKING-CLASS EXPERIENCE, 1756–2009, at 192-216 (Donna Haverty-Stacke & 
Daniel J. Walkowitz eds., 2010) [hereinafter Boris & Klein, Organizing the 
Carework Economy]. 
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important because they cannot be offshored. Wherever 
capital may migrate globally to produce goods or provide 
technical services, care work stays home. As had been the 
case with manufacturing a century earlier, waves of new 
immigrants continually replenish these jobs. Consequently, 
women’s labors—once considered outside of the market or at 
the periphery of economic life—have now become the 
strategic sites for worker struggle and the direction and 
character of the American labor movement.  
Just about the only growth in the United States labor 
movement has been in health care, public employment, food 
service and hotels, education, and domestic labors.19 These 
workers transformed organizing strategy, union demands, 
and the very nature of collective bargaining. Home care 
became a pivotal sector in which unions experimented with 
new tactics. Since the job stood outside New Deal labor 
laws, unionization had to take shape apart from that 
framework. Workers also had to take account of the complex 
interpersonal relations essential to carework. They had to 
enter into alliances with the receivers of care (who have 
labeled themselves “consumers”). Even though they labored 
in private homes and had no standing as employees, they 
turned the public welfare state itself into a terrain of social 
struggle. By 2010, over 400,000 home care workers had 
joined unions, although over the last year their union and 
bargaining rights have been jeopardized by the conservative 
governors that took over state houses in 2010 Republican 
sweep.20  
We have sought to rethink the history of the American 
welfare state from the perspective of care work. Social 
policies are not just income transfer programs. They also 
depend on a particular configuration of labor that facilitates 
support on a daily basis. Government has had a central role 
in creating labor markets in human and social services. 
Broad trends in United States social policy over the latter 
  
 19. See Dorothy Sue Cobble & Michael Merrill, The Promise of Service 
Unionism, in SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Cameron McDonald & 
Marek Korczynski eds., 2009); John Schmitt & Kris Warner, The Changing Face 
of Labor, 1983–2008, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 1, 18 (2009); Economic News 
Release, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
 20. Interview with Keith Kelleher, President, SEIU Healthcare Illinois and 
Indiana (Oct. 2011). 
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half of twentieth century fostered the creation of new 
occupations, funded by the state, and actively channeled 
particular workers into these jobs, especially poor and 
minority women, deploying and perpetuating gender and 
racial inequality. The beneficiaries of the services, the 
structure of the industry, and the terms and conditions of 
the labor were all products of state intervention.  
Home care has existed in a clouded nether world 
between public and private, family care and employment. It 
was possible because of the devaluation of women’s work 
and the stigmatization attached to the labor of poor women 
of color. The labor, however, is devalued not just because of 
its ascribed racial or gendered meanings but because of the 
way the state chooses to structure it. This outcome, we 
show, is historical rather than epiphenomenal; devaluation 
is not only structural and ideological but a product of 
conflict and accommodation between experts, state 
authorities, workers, care receivers, and institutions since 
the New Deal.  
For decades, while the American population, like that of 
Western Europe, has aged and baby boomers have moved 
toward retirement, the United States Congress failed to 
enact a genuine long-term care policy. In the absence of 
guaranteed social insurance, the default has been to use 
public assistance and Medicaid. In our research, we 
primarily discuss services funded through various public 
programs. They are not unconnected, however, to the 
allegedly “private market” wherein middle-class families 
purchase care for their loved ones. The United States 
reliance primarily on means-tested social services available 
only to the poorest people fundamentally shaped the entire 
labor market for care. The claim of the Supreme Court in 
2007 in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,21 in 
sustaining the exclusion of home care workers from the 
nation’s wage and hour law, exemplifies the fear that only 
through cheap labor can we provide long term care. The 
assumption that the provision of care is a zero-sum trade-off 
further implies that denial and self-sacrifice are essential to 
a genuine “ethic of care.” Caring for America argues that we 
all have a stake in rethinking that assumption.  
  
 21. 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
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I.  ORIGINS 
Home care as a distinct occupation emerged in the crisis 
of the Great Depression to meet both welfare and health 
imperatives.22 One strand took shape as work relief for 
unemployed black women who previously labored in 
domestic service.23 During the New Deal, state funding 
began to play a significant role in formulating a new 
occupation that helped poor families and individuals with 
medical emergencies, chronic illness, and old age, while 
curtailing the costs of institutionalization.24 Through 
Homemaker Service, state and local governments would 
provide support to one group of needy Americans, women 
with children, through employing another needy group, 
poor, unemployed women, as “substitute mothers.”25 The 
government employed homemakers directly through the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA).26  
Relieving public hospitals of long-term elderly and 
chronically ill patients became the other origin of state-
supported home-based care.27 The WPA initiated programs 
to move such people out of the hospital and give them the 
necessary assistance to become “independent” at home.28 
These programs often called the workers “housekeepers,” 
reflecting the non-medical designation of service workers in 
  
 22. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 11. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id.; MAUD MORLOCK, HOMEMAKER SERVICES: HISTORY AND 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1-3 (1964); Report on the First Year’s Work of the WPA Project, 
February 15, 1937, in Mary C. Jarrett Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith 
College, Box 4, Folder 50.  
 27. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 11. 
 28. Id. at 11, 28-30 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE WORKS PROGRESS 
ADMINISTRATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK 212 (1945); Marta Fraenkel, 
Housekeeping Service for Chronic Patients, WELFARE COUNCIL OF NEW YORK CITY 
(1942); S.S. Goldwater, The Aims of the Department of Hospitals, in THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH IN PREVENTION AND CARE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS: 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING HELD BY THE COMMITTEE ON CHRONIC 
ILLNESS, in Mary C. Jarrett Papers, Sophia Smith Archives, Smith College, Box 
3, Folder 48; The Hospitalization of the Chronically Ill (NBC broadcast Apr. 18, 
1935), in Mary C. Jarrett Papers, Sophia Smith Archives, Smith College, Box 3, 
Folder 48). 
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hospital settings.29 In either case, central to this origin was 
the location of the program in assistance to the poor.30  Not 
only the workers but also the clients, who obtained 
eligibility for the service from the Department of Welfare, 
had to be destitute.31 
Yet while these 1930s public works programs created 
paid caregiving positions, New Deal labor law ignored the 
resulting workforce. The labor rights of the New Deal—old 
age insurance, unemployment benefits, collective 
bargaining, minimum wages, and maximum hours—
excluded nurse companions, homemakers, and other in-
home care workers from coverage. In 1940, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) categorized nurse-companions and 
other in-home care workers hired directly by clients as 
domestic workers.32 As the New Deal made work the entrée 
to a host of new social benefits, domestic work suffered 
further marginalization.  
The New Deal left a three-fold legacy, which persisted 
through the rest of the century.33 Although tied to the 
medical sector, the state would pay for home-based care 
through welfare agencies but often with federal funds. 
Second, policy experts and welfare administrators saw 
female public assistance recipients as a ready supply of 
labor for home care.34 And, third, the exclusion of home 
attendants from national wages and hours laws would 
remain in place for the next seven decades.35 Though first 
focused on families with children, with the growth of Social 
Security after World War II, homemaker services came to 
  
 29. Id. at 11; The Story of the Housekeeping Aides Project, March 7, 1938, in 
HEALTH, PRODUCTION, AND SERVICE PROJECTS OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND SERVICE 
DIVISION OF THE WPA, NEW YORK CITY (1939), available at Part I, PSP, folder, 
“Narrative Reports NYC,” RG 69, Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., College 
Park, Md.  
 30. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 11. 
 31.  Fraenkel, supra note 28, at 81-82. 
 32. See PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND DOMESTIC 
SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920–1945, at 111-35 (1989); MARY POOLE, 
SEGREGATED ORIGINS OF SOCIAL SECURITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE WELFARE 
STATE (2006). 
 33. Id. at 39. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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prioritize the support for the elderly, a group of voters 
privileged by the American welfare state over other 
recipients of social assistance.36 
Following World War II, private family agencies led by 
women social workers and aided by the U.S. Children’s 
Bureau attempted to create a good job for “mature women” 
and define a new occupation—a job that took place in the 
home but performed the public work of the welfare state.37  
Over the next decade, a mixture of public welfare 
departments and private agencies established visiting 
homemaker programs and boarding programs to maintain 
aged and disabled people in the community rather than in 
more expensive hospitals and nursing facilities.38 The 
service grew through demonstration projects and charities 
receiving child welfare grants and assistance to the indigent 
aged.39 They aimed at convincing the community to fund 
centralized public services.40 
The promotion of home care in the two decades after 
WWII demonstrates how competing definitions of care—
particularly the labor of care—fundamentally shaped old 
age, disability, and welfare policy; job training; and an 
emerging labor market.41 Welfare, health, and medical 
professionals held contrasting views on the location of care; 
they also had distinct ideas about who should perform the 
valorized or menial aspects of such labor.42 Gendered and 
racialized understandings of carework, home life, and 
institutional authority initially led home care down two 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 44 nn.18, 20 (citing U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, SUPERVISED 
HOMEMAKER SERVICE: A METHOD OF CHILD CARE, PUB. 296 (1943); NAT’L COMM. 
FOR HOMEMAKER SERV., Minutes of Meeting, Nov. 13-14, 1947, New York 4, 
available at Central Files 1949–1952, Box 119, Folder “4-6-11,” RG-102, U.S. 
Children’s Bureau Records, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., College Park, 
Md.; Homemaker (dom. Ser.) housekeeper, visiting, 677, Domestic Service 
Occupations (2.00.00-2.09.99), in DIV. OF OCCUPATIONAL ANALYSIS, USES, FSA, 
SSA, BUREAU OF EMP’T SECURITY, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, VOL. II 
(1949), at 59).  
 38. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 40. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 41-42. 
 42. Id. at 42. 
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developmental tracks: a social work model and a medical 
care model.43 Throughout this process, social workers sought 
to maintain some control over a new occupation in the face 
of its increased medicalization.44  
The rapidly expanding postwar medical system sought 
its own strategies for aiding the chronically ill and disabled 
persons. Home care offered a possible remedy for problems 
of overcrowding and patient priority driven by budget 
concerns.45 Voluntary hospitals could move chronically ill, 
often impoverished patients out—without abandoning 
them.46 In this medical model, home care would become one 
element in a far-reaching medical institutional complex 
extending outward from the hospital.47  
Welfare and medical initiatives shared an emphasis on 
dependency, defined in social, psychological, physical, and 
gendered terms.48 Professionals in each realm agreed that 
large numbers of relief recipients suffered from chronic 
illness or impairments.49 With the right intervention—or 
care—a significant percentage of such individuals should 
and could be moved off public assistance, the categorical 
programs for the elderly, disabled, and children.50 Each 
group deployed notions of rehabilitation toward the goal of 
ending dependency, believing that it could help patients or 
clients achieve some final state of independence.51 Yet while 
social workers envisioned home care as a public job—with 
the features of dependable employment—the predominance 
of the medical model, among other things, resulted in 
increased casualization of the labor.  
From the 1940s up to the early 1960s, social workers 
and welfare advocates transformed (through patchwork 
means and backdoor channels) a program originally 
  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 56. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at 41. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 66. 
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intended for children into a long-term care system.52 That it 
took shape as a welfare service would have ramifications 
well into the future—for policy makers, consumers, workers, 
and the American labor movement. For in the years after 
World War II, the major expansions of the United States 
welfare state occurred through the Hill-Burton Act, which 
funneled money into hospital development and medical 
institutions, and the growth of Social Security pensions.53 
Advocates for home care never had access to those more 
generous components of the American welfare state.54 They 
only had access to the lesser titles of the Social Security 
Act—those set up for child welfare, adult categorical aid (old 
age indigence, blindness, and disability) and social 
services.55 Although home-based care would eventually 
become crucial to the medical system, these programs 
stayed within the realm of welfare policy.  
Proponents of the service created a dual ideology of 
rehabilitation. The “deserving” clients of social assistance—
the elderly, chronically ill, and disabled—depended on the 
“undeserving” recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC).56 From the 1930s on, each generation of 
government officials clung to the premise that poor single 
mothers could end their own dependency on welfare by 
maintaining the independence of those incapacitated 
through no fault of their own—that is, by performing care 
work.57 They could become rehabilitated in the process of 
rehabilitating others.58  
What developed before the War on Poverty was a 
combined public/private system of care with poor women on 
public assistance as both the receivers and workers. The 
War on Poverty in the 1960s provided new vehicles for the 
state to expand the home care labor market. The new Office 
of Economic Opportunity in 1964 created programs for 
AFDC recipients to meet the labor shortage in service 
  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id.  
 55. Id. at 12, 51-52. 
 56. Id. at 12. 
 57. Id. at 12-13. 
 58. Id. at 13. 
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occupations, especially health and child aides, home 
attendants, and homemaker aides, positions still classified 
by the United States Department of Labor as similar to 
domestic service.59 Anti-poverty warriors argued these could 
be made over into “New Careers.”60 But essentially, the new 
career turned out to be much like the old one: a low-waged 
job in domestic labor. The legacy of the Johnson years lay 
with new rights and services for the elderly through the 
Older Americans Act and Medicare.  Because home care, 
while necessary to keep people in their communities was 
deemed not medical, few Medicare dollars would go to it. 
Instead, Medicaid became over time the de facto funding 
mechanism for home care: needs-based and dependent on 
state-level largess.61 It remained part of the contentious 
politics of welfare. 
Although home care workers began organizing through 
the variety of social movements of the 1960s and 1970s—
especially welfare rights and domestic workers rights—they 
found themselves once again pushed into the economic 
shadows when the FLSA came up for amendment in 1974. 
With every anti-poverty program that channeled particular 
poor women into home care jobs, Congress continually 
deferred the inclusion of care workers in the labor law. 
During the 1960s, amendments to the FLSA placed 
agricultural, nursing home, and many retail workers under 
  
 59. See Toward Full Employment: Proposals for a Comprehensive 
Employment and Manpower Policy in the United States: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Emp’t and Manpower of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 
88th Cong. v-vii, at 25 (1964); Services to the Elderly on Public Assistance: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal, State, and Community Servs. of the 
Special Comm. on Aging, 89th Cong. 10 (1965) (statement of Dr. Ellen Winston).  
 60. ARTHUR PEARL & FRANK RIESSMAN, NEW CAREERS FOR THE POOR: THE 
NONPROFESSIONAL IN HUMAN SERVICES 13 (1965); FRED POWLEDGE, NEW 
CAREERS: REAL JOBS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DISADVANTAGED 1-3 (Public Aff. 
Comm., Public Aff. Pamphlet No. 427 1968). 
 61. See PENNY HOLLANDER FELDMAN ET AL., WHO CARES FOR THEM? WORKERS 
IN THE HOME CARE INDUSTRY (1990); ADMIN. ON AGING, HUMAN RESOURCES IN 
FIELD OF AGING: HOMEMAKER-HOME HEALTH AIDE SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON 
AGING OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN GERONTOLOGY, NO. 2 (1977); Katherine Ricker-
Smith, A Historical and Critical Overview of the Development and Operation of 
California’s In-Home Supportive Services Program, S.F. HOME HEALTH SERV., 
GRANT HEW-100-78-0027, 31-36 (1978), available at Calif. State Library; 
Brahna Trager, Homemaker-Home Health Aide Services in the U.S., U.S. 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-12 (1973).  
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the federal wage and hour law.62 Still, most in Congress 
could not accept home care as work, on par with other paid 
employment; a mixture of housekeeping and bodily care, the 
job consisted of tasks expected from unpaid wives, 
daughters, and mothers. In 1974, Congress finally included 
private household workers in the wage and hour law in one 
of the largest legislative expansions of FLSA.63 Nursing 
home workers were also included for overtime pay.64 But at 
this moment of triumph—a critical civil rights gain for 
women of color—those doing the same care work in 
individual homes were left out.65 
A definitional ruse reduced the home aide to an elder 
companion.66 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare explicitly refused “to include within the terms 
‘domestic service’ such activities as babysitting and acting 
as a companion.”67 Companion or sitter implied friendly 
visitors, not women who labored to support themselves or 
their families.68 The passive term “watch” implied no real 
work was going on.69 When the Department of Labor 
promulgated rules for the implementation of the 1974 FLSA 
amendments, it codified this previously nonexistent 
“companionship exemption.”70 Congress remedied one 
  
 62. See Phyllis Palmer, Outside the Law: Agricultural and Domestic Workers 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 J. POL’Y HIST. 419, 419-40 (1995). 
 63. See Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Making Home Care: Law and Social 
Policy in the U.S. Welfare State, in INTIMATE LABORS: CULTURES, TECHNOLOGIES, 
AND THE POLITICS OF CARE 187-203 (Eileen Boris & Rachel Salazar Parrenas eds., 
2010) [hereinafter Boris & Klein, Making Home Care].  
 64.  See id. 
 65. “Highlights of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974,” S1, 
B11, “Minimum Law,” 417-18.  
 66. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 131. 
 67. See id.; U.S. Congress, S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Fair Labor 
Standards Act Amendments of 1971, at 30 (1971); SUBCOMM. ON LABOR AND 
PUBLIC WELFARE, UNITED STATES SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUBLIC LAW 93-259), at 964 (1976) 
(statement of Sen. Javits) [hereinafter “LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FLSA OF 
1974”]. 
 68. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 131. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Boris & Klein, Making Home Care, supra note 63, at 196-97. 
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injustice but generated a new inequality by explicitly 
omitting those newly termed as elder companions.  
The final legislative language opened the way for 
administrative rule-making that would keep homemakers 
outside the law.  Whether from outdated notions of the 
companion or downright ignorance about the maintenance 
of impaired individuals, Congress classified household 
chores such as “making lunch or throwing a diaper into the 
washing machine” as “incidental” rather than integral to 
the labor.71 It was then up to the Department of Labor’s 
Wage and Hour Division to draft the new regulations that 
would implement the FLSA amendments.72 After an open 
comment period, the Wage and Hour Division issued its 
final ruling in February 1975 exempting elder companions 
from the newly extended FLSA coverage.73 What 
distinguished the companion from the domestic now was the 
amount of time spent in housework not directly related to 
care. If housework was incidental to the job, less than 20% 
of the workday, then the worker was a companion rather 
than a domestic and therefore outside the law.74 This 
formulation ignored the actual work of home care, which 
involved a range of household tasks that allowed the family 
or individual to function in a domestic environment.75 The 
final rule excluded not only aides hired directly by a 
household but also those employed by hospitals and private 
health and social welfare agencies (referred to as “third 
parties”) previously covered under the law.76 The Wage and 
Hour Division offered no explanation for changing the 
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status of home care workers.77 The rule freed staffing 
agencies from paying minimum wages and overtime.  
The reclassification of home care workers in the mid-
1970s occurred just as the demand for long-term care began 
to explode, with senior citizens and a disability rights 
movement calling for community and home-based 
alternatives to institutionalization in the face of horrifying 
nursing home scandals.78 After 1976, the home health care 
sector entered a phase of significant growth—that is yet 
unabated—as counties and states turned aides into more 
casualized workers. Conveniently, it came just as home care 
service was rapidly becoming a growth industry; changes to 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs, 
especially after 1980, fueled a new for-profit sector.79 This 
determination that home care would be low-paid, low-cost, 
labor somehow reassured governments that herein lay the 
answer to several welfare problems: overcrowding of public 
hospitals, rising cost of nursing homes, an aging population, 
and public refusal to spend tax dollars on “welfare.”  
Two soon-to-be dominant forms of delivery emerged in 
the 1970s: the independent contractor and the private 
vendor.80 Local and state governments turned to contracting 
home care through private agencies or designating care 
workers as “independent contractors” without benefits or 
job security. By distancing such workers from public 
employment, states denied responsibility for the working 
conditions of an occupation whose contours government 
policies had done so much to set during the previous quarter 
century.  
  
 77. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 133. 
 78. See id. at 115-16 nn.106-07 (citing Frank J. Prial, Abram Names 4 to 
Panel on Nursing Home Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1975, at 69; Excerpts from 
Cuomo’s Report to Carey About Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1975, at 30; 
John L. Hess, Care of Aged Poor a Growing Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1974, at 
1, 40; Memorandum from Alice M. Brophy, to Marvin Schick and Leon Panetta 
(Mar. 18, 1971); Subject Files, in JOHN LINDSAY PAPERS 1966–1973). 
 79. Andrew Sasz, The Labor Impacts of Policy Change in Health Care: How 
Federal Policy Transformed Home Health Organizations and Their Labor 
Practices, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 191, 195-96 (1990); The Black Box 
Report, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 2 (1986). 
 80. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 133. 
2013] TAKE IT TO THE TOP 307 
II. ORGANIZING 
Even as the welfare state location of the labor devalued 
the workforce, it opened up a new site of social and political 
struggle. How could these women gain a measure of 
political and economic power, in spite of enormous 
structural, ideological, and political obstacles? The story is a 
complicated one, especially since they faced the challenge of 
figuring out the structures of an ever shifting, evolving 
welfare state.  Structurally, unions seeking to organize 
home care workers had to deal with the reality that the jobs 
were dispersed—while there were tens of thousands of 
workers, there was no common work site. Most workers 
never saw each other, and many had little sense that there 
were so many others out there doing the same kind of work. 
Further, the work is different. The actual labor process 
is relational, creating interdependence.81 Such work consists 
of more than tasks completed. It doesn’t produce something 
that can be quantitatively measured, or easily represented, 
in the GNAT82 Essential to the job are emotional labor, 
affection, and building trust.83 Workers cannot go on strike 
and simply leave clients who are unable to get out of bed.84 
After spending many hours, weeks, even years with a client, 
the job may end suddenly with the death of the person cared 
for. Part of these workers’ struggle involves establishing 
legitimacy of care itself in a way that defies our most taken-
for-granted definitions of work as production. 
Politically, unions faced an additional challenge: how to 
build a labor movement of poor people in a service so 
heavily dependent on state funding. The emergence of this 
movement coincided with President Reagan’s cuts to social 
service, welfare, urban policy, tax policies, and Medicaid.85  
Women got squeezed as both clients and workers of the 
welfare state.  
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We have identified a series of organizing strategies that 
responded to the structure of home care since the 1960s. 
First, organizing took place among homemakers as 
employees of social welfare departments, that is, as welfare 
workers in New York swept up by the mid-1960s rise of 
public employee unionism.86 Second, organizing occurred 
among welfare recipients, led by the independent living 
movement, which lobbied for the payments that made home 
care as a consumer service possible. But by winning a 
method of service delivery based on the employment of the 
care worker as an “independent contractor” (or provider), it 
established a framework that made it difficult for workers 
to find any clear employer to bargain collectively with.87 A 
third organizing strategy was unionization as part of the 
service sector—through unions such as the SEIU.88 This 
involved coalition building, community organizing, and 
political unionism. A fourth organizing strategy coincided 
with the union effort: legal challenges to exclusion of 
workers from definitions of “employee” or labor standards.89 
The legal challenge produced a two-track result: 
restructuring the state through public policy (for example, 
by creating new public authorities in California or state 
Home Care Commissions elsewhere to stand in for the 
multitude of dispersed employers);90 and a series of court 
cases that eventually culminated in an unsuccessful 2007 
Supreme Court case, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. 
Coke.91 A fifth and final organizing strategy has emerged not 
from unions but from a revitalized domestic worker 
movement led by immigrant women from the Americas and 
Asia to revalue care under the banner of “Caring Across the 
Generations.”92 This movement aims to improve jobs 
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through training, higher wages, a new path to citizenship, 
and connecting those who need care with those who do 
care.93 
The story of home care organizing in Chicago and 
Illinois in the final decades of the twentieth century 
powerfully illustrates the tangle of public and private forces 
against which home care organizing occurred and how 
workers came out of the shadows to fight back.  
In the mid-1970s, Illinois took advantage of federal 
monies to develop community care for the elderly.94 Illinois 
initially ran its home care program out of public welfare.95 
In 1979 Illinois established two programs to pay for home 
care through its general revenues.96 The Illinois Department 
of Aging started the Community Care Program, which 
contracted with a wide-range of nonprofit and proprietary 
agencies to offer homemaker and housekeeping services to 
those over age sixty.97 Workers became employees of 
vendors rather than the state.98 In a separate program 
disabled people under sixty would receive similar assistance 
from the Department of Rehabilitative Services (DORS), 
funded in good part after 1984 by Medicaid.99 In keeping 
with the ethos of independence, DORS relied on a different 
mode: clients hired their own provider, who could be family 
or friends, with the state claiming to be a co-employer—and 
it set wages, for most of the decade at minimum wage.100 
Workers had no hospital or medical insurance, paid 
vacation, compensated sick days, life insurance, or 
compensation for time spent traveling to and from clients’ 
homes, often on long bus and subway rides.101  
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ACORN came to town to change all of this in 1983, 
planting a branch of its United Labor Unions (ULU).102 Key 
ACORN leaders and rank and filers had come out of the 
welfare rights movement.103 Like other radicals of the 
period, they had developed a sectoral analysis that linked 
low wage workers with those on public assistance, including 
poor single mothers.104 The ACORN model tied together 
workplace issues, such as wages and working conditions, 
with community ones, such as struggles over housing, 
banking, and living wage campaigns. Union organizing was 
one part of a broader mobilization against poverty. ULU, 
which in Chicago would become SEIU Local 880, used direct 
action and political lobbying with agency-by-agency 
bargaining.105 It built power by recruiting members through 
door to door canvassing, house meetings, and developing 
leaders for specific actions. From the get go, it mobilized 
members for electoral campaigns to gain access to political 
power. It would “build an organization first” that could 
maintain itself during workplace campaigns that could take 
years.106 Members paid dues from the moment they signed 
up, well before the union had a contract or certification; for 
people who made little, paying over that few dollars a 
month cemented organizational loyalty.107  
With a cadre of just fifteen to twenty paid members, out 
of a total workforce of 225, the union dramatically made its 
presence known in October 1983 at National Home Care 
Systems (NHS), a domestic temp agency formerly named 
McMaid.108 An organizing committee, led by employees Irma 
Sherman, Doris Gould, and Juanita Hill, showed up at the 
McMaid/NHS office on pay day, and gathered workers 
willing to listen to their testimonials of mistreatment and 
disrespect. Sherman, Gould, Hill, and others marched into 
the offices chanting, “We’re Fired UP,” singing, and 
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demanding a meeting with the boss.109 When the executive 
director came out, Sherman announced their union was 
ULU 880, and asked him to sign a “Recognition 
Agreement.”110 He declined, called the police, and retreated 
to his office amid louder chants.111 Their union had become 
public; the workers had made their point.112  This event was 
the first of many “recognition actions.”113  
By the 1980s, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) had become essentially dysfunctional, as 
management perfected ways to contest every aspect of the 
organizing process, undermine union elections, and stall 
bargaining.114 Local 880’s collective self-assertion of the 
union served as an adaptive strategy to deal with the 
limitations of the NLRB regime. As lead organizer Keith 
Kelleher explained, “we didn’t wait for the employer to 
formally recognize us, but forced the employer to deal with 
us without official recognition.”115 The members made it a 
union, not the state.116 Since they were treated as not real 
workers within the framework of the nation’s laws, these 
women honed a different set of tactics for unionism in the 
care work sector that linked public and private: recognition 
actions, member bargaining, direction action, political 
lobbying and pressure, and strategic use of “consumer 
choice.”117  
At NHS, the union won its election fairly quickly, but 
contract bargaining turned into trench warfare that led it to 
combine the militant direct action of welfare rights—
showing up en masse at the owner’s plush suburban estate 
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and pinning a notice on his door—with political unionism, 
as Local 880 creatively deployed tactics that blurred the 
public and private domains.118 Workers turned their 
relationship with consumers and the state to their 
advantage.119 They raised the specter that they would ask 
their clients to transfer to another agency.120 In the care 
work sector, moving consumers to another agency had a 
similar impact to a strike, without leaving those cared for 
stranded.121 The union then gambled on calling an actual 
strike, which required notice to the State Department of 
Aging as well as the company. NHS now faced the prospect 
that the state would drop it as a problematic contractor and 
decided to settle. Local 880 won a “union shop,” paid 
holidays and vacations, a grievance procedure, health and 
safety protective clause, and a “Dignity and Respect” 
clause.122 Subsequently, when facing other recalcitrant 
agencies, the union helped to move former employees to 
union shops.123 
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The union consistently cultivated rank and file leaders 
from among home attendant members, like local presidents 
Irma Sherman and Helen Miller.124 The women created a 
social world around the union, with regular meetings, 
parties, barbeques, recognition ceremonies, letter writing 
campaigns, marches, and neighborhood alliances.125 They 
held “speakouts” and “honk-ins,” stopping traffic.126 These 
most invisible workers made themselves visible and 
audible.127  
Winning a contract was certainly a big victory, but it 
was only the first step Any ability to raise pay depended on 
the public budget. ULU mobilized its own members, taking 
busloads of workers to the capitol at Springfield, Illinois to 
meet with legislators, the Illinois Department of Aging, and 
the Republican governor. For these battles, though, the 
ULU local needed greater political clout and a larger 
support network. After a member vote, Chicago’s unit voted 
in 1985 to merge into the SEIU, a fast growing union 
representing over one million service workers in public and 
private workplaces.128  
But Local 880 cut its own political path. It drew on 
direct action tactics more familiar to welfare rights than to 
the late twentieth century labor movement. Toward the end 
of 1985, seventy members picketed the Governor’s office and 
won a new state Home Care Task Force, which would 
enable all players to develop policy guidelines and 
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coordinate demands for increased reimbursement rates.129 
Such political remedies institutionalized the potential of 
provider agencies and the union to work together in the 
arena of the welfare state. From then on, 880 workers 
organized busloads of union members to go to Springfield 
and meet with legislators, Department of Aging staff, and 
governors. 
One other key factor helped the union win its first 
contract. A new NHS executive director, Mark Heaney, 
came on board in May 1985, and he too understood the 
political economy of home care.130 Where the previous 
executive took an ideological hard line against the union, 
Heaney approached the situation as a pragmatist.131 He 
grasped both the potential threat from the union’s appeal to 
the state and the strategic advantages of “partnership”132 
Heaney realized the union’s political organizing and 
disruption could cost NHS its state contract.133 After the 
June 1985 settlement, Heaney kept communication with the 
union open, worked with the union to implement a health 
insurance plan, and sought out the points where NHS could 
use the union to increase its client base.134 Heaney was not 
an unequivocal friend of the union, but he recognized they 
had a common interest in protecting the state’s social 
welfare budget, fighting tax cuts, and disciplining the 
market.135   
Where those interests overlapped, the partnership 
worked. Heaney served on the Governor’s Task Force too, 
where he joined the union in pushing to increase the state 
reimbursement rate.136 Described by the union as the first 
substantial raise in four years, this 1986 boost helped 
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secure an even better second contract from NHS and 
affected thousands of other home care workers around 
Illinois.137  Amid Reagan’s open warfare on the welfare state, 
for-profit, corporate NHS distributed postcards to all staff 
employees to write to the legislature and the governor to 
support proposed tax increases.138 By the early 1990s, NHS 
top management even appropriated the language of justice 
and comparable worth.139 Pointing out that Illinois paid 
more to “a janitor to clean floors and toilets” than to 
homemakers and aides, NHS owner Andrew Wright 
asserted “that a gross injustice exists in the reimbursement 
rates paid for home care services and that a rate adjustment 
is due.”140 To coordinate collective bargaining with the state 
budget process, NHS shared information with the union on 
hours billed to the state for chore housekeepers and 
homemakers, and both union and company cooperated to 
force shady agencies out of the market.141 In that sense, the 
union helped to stabilize its industry by setting best 
practices, rewarding firms that met its labor standards, and 
policing non-union employers much as unions like the 
United Mine Workers and Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
did earlier in the century.142 
Cooperation, though, remained circumscribed, 
especially concerning balance of power. NHS and Local 880 
did not exactly lobby together.143 The union sent its people to 
Springfield, while the company or Association of Home Care 
Providers worked their own channels of influence.144 When it 
  
 137. Id at 170; Year End/Year Begin Report-1986 (Jan. 2, 1987), supra note 
119.  
 138. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 170; Letter from Mark Heaney, Exec. 
Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys., to Serv. Emp'rs. Int’l Union Local 880 Bargaining 
Comm. (June 3, 1991), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 11, Folder 42, available at 
Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Mark Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home 
Care Sys., to Nat’l Home Care Sys. Staff—Office & Field (June 5, 1987), in 
LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 44, available at Wisconsin Historical Society. 
 139. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 170. 
 140. Id.; Letter from Andrew Wright, Owner, Nat’l Home Care Sys., to Mark 
Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys. (Dec. 1, 1993), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, 
Box 11, Folder 46, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.  
 141. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 170. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
316 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
came down to the dividing up the rate increase between 
wages and profits, they became adversaries again.145 
Meanwhile, the union continually filed grievances against 
the company on minimum wage violations.146    
Perpetually, though, Local 880 and ACORN ran up 
against the public-private conundrum that shaped home 
care employment.147 Vendors claimed that the state was the 
employer or coemployer, and the state argued that the 
vendors were the responsible party. On one hand, the state 
placed them under the Domestic Workers Law (which after 
1974 meant they should earn at least minimum wage). On 
the other, when the union tried to gain redress for wage and 
hour violations, the state waved the 1975 FLSA 
companionship exemption in their faces. The legal structure 
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made it impossible for them to organize collectively or win 
any economic gains through private agencies.  
The way the state structured care in response to other 
stakeholders also mattered. Thousands of Chicago-area 
home care workers did not work for vendor agencies. 
Through DORS, which serviced the disabled, workers were 
classified as “independent providers.”148 Without them in the 
union, the state had an enormous reserve pool of labor. Yet, 
the union encountered the same obfuscation of identifying 
the employer. Was it the state, which allotted the service 
hours, paid the salaries, and withheld workers comp? Or 
was it the client who had “the sole responsibility to hire, 
dismiss, train, supervise and discipline workers”?149 
The union proceeded with its organizing project 
anyway. The state comptroller’s office maintained records of 
checks issued to the attendants, available for public 
viewing. Local 880 organizers combed through these and 
painstakingly built a list.150 They reached middle-aged 
women like future President Miller, a transplanted rural 
Mississippian who had labored in laundries and factories.151 
Her husband was a union man, and she was one of those 
women whose efforts sustained the black church.152 Soon she 
was going along on house visits and, like other DORS 
workers, participating in the life of the local through 
membership meetings, fundraising events, canvassing, and 
lobbying days.153 DORS workers joined the fabric of the 
union, participating in membership meetings, fundraising 
events, canvassing, legal actions, and lobbying days.154 
These members led a legislative campaign for a Home care 
Workers’ Bill of Rights, collecting pledges from legislators.155 
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An involved workforce remained essential to Local 880’s 
vision of unionism.156  
The state refused to formally recognize the union but 
through persistent mobilization, political allies, and 
militant pressure, the union compelled the state to accede to 
wage raises and other demands. Between 1985 and 1990, 
through member lobbying and political clout, the union 
managed to win wage hikes to $4.50 an hour and eliminate 
underpayments.157 Through incremental steps like a “Meet 
and Confer” agreement in 1990, workers won an 
institutional foothold within the political process that 
determined their security and that of their clients, while the 
union kept its sights on the horizon and built for some day 
in the future when a majority of workers would become 
members.158 
Based on their caring relationships, workers also acted 
politically with consumers, as disability rights activists 
refer to themselves. Their fates were linked by the question 
of enough hours for the service.  In the economic downturn 
of the early 1990s, Illinois cut services to elderly and DORS 
by refusing new applicants. ADAPT, a militant independent 
living group, launched confrontational protests in 
Chicago.159 Disability rights activists brought suit, with the 
result that a federal court prohibited the state from denying 
eligible Medicaid recipients in-home services.160 Local 880 
workers became allies with independent living activists and 
advocates to “stop the cuts.”161 Women and men in 
wheelchairs rolled through Springfield, Illinois to the 
capitol, along with workers who carried oversized pennies.162 
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Home care workers would defend these entitlements by 
creating an arena of struggle in which workers refused to 
play their role—providing care on the cheap 
For another decade, the workers paid their dues, 
attended meetings, and built the union—still without 
recognition. Finally, through financial and ground support 
for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Rod 
Blagojevich, in 2004, a labor-supportive governor came into 
office and through executive order formally recognized 
SEIU Local 880 as the collective bargaining agent for these 
workers.163 Within months, the state legislature codified his 
executive order into law, representing one of largest formal 
extensions of labor rights in decades.164 They had, in fact, 
changed the landscape of political power. 
CONCLUSION 
Longer life expectancy means that more of us live with 
chronic illness. A majority of Americans, across the 
spectrum of class and ethnicity, will at some point depend 
on a caretaker, often one who has long labored in poverty 
and struggled to balance her own and others’ social needs. 
The macroeconomic structuring of the occupation, as well as 
its interpersonal challenges, heightens the stresses of an 
already emotionally and psychologically intense and 
economically precarious job. Workers, family members, 
state administrators, and policy makers all wring their 
hands in frustration over the undependability of home care 
services; for the former there are not enough trustworthy or 
reliable workers.  
In December of 2011, President Obama made good on a 
campaign promise and finally announced that the United 
States Department of Labor would move to overturn the 
companionship exemption and include these workers in the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA.165 
Obama’s proposal not only rectifies a thirty-year injustice, 
but also faces the realities of both our aging society and 
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service labor in the twenty-first century American economy. 
The new Department of Labor proposal explicitly recognizes 
that housekeeping is integrally bound up with caregiving in 
the home, valuing the multi-dimensions of care as work. It 
mandates agency payment for travel time of aides who move 
between clients over the course of a day, acknowledging 
that the very nature of the job means they do not labor in 
one place for a standard number of hours.166 It closes 
loopholes that the old category “employee” has allowed so 
many to slip through.  
While the job title has changed repeatedly since the 
1930s, these workers always have performed a combination 
of basic bodily care (bathing, dressing, feeding, and 
ambulation) and housekeeping. In the current fiscal crisis, 
states have used the slipperiness of the companionship 
terminology to squeeze the workers and extract more 
unpaid labor. State agencies are recalculating what family 
members would supposedly provide anyway, reducing the 
amount of home care support based on expanding the range 
of unpaid labor. States are reducing the hours a worker can 
spend with a client and targeting housekeeping for 
elimination.  
This decades-long fight, therefore, is not simply about 
the ability to earn the minimum wage or just above it for 
working even longer hours; that would not be much to bring 
home, nor greatly bolster one’s ability to sustain a home. If 
the rule change were solely the ability to earn $7.25 an hour 
and over-time, home-care workers would still be poor. Its 
deeper possibility is the potential to reestablish some notion 
of labor standards, rights, and security—the very elements 
that conservatives and employers have been so successful at 
subverting over the last two decades, especially in the 
service sectors. Clearly, the exemption of workers from 
labor standards is not making better care more widely 
accessible. Instead, the stigmatization of care—and those 
who need it—is creating greater insecurity and hardship It 
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compromises the independence and dignity of those on both 
sides of the relation. Separating better care from better jobs 
and working conditions has moved us no further toward a 
viable and decent long-term care program. It turns out the 
devaluation of one has only perpetuated the devaluation of 
the other. 
